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ABSTRACT
Lawyers are the engineers and architects of contractual frame-
works. Arguably, with respect to the success of the undertaking, they
occupy a place of equal importance to the parties executing the con-
tracts. After all, contracts are put in place to help prevent problems from
arising in long-term business relations. As studies of business interac-
tions show time and again, and I have discussed in earlier articles,
keeping conflict at bay in long-term business relations is not an easy
task. Many are still perplexed to learn what the research consistently
indicates: that contracts themselves are partly responsible for the ten-
sions that arise. In fact, contracts seem to do little to preserve
relationships; instead, they tend to fuel disputes and trigger costly litiga-
tion.
What are the factors that underlie this common failure of contracts?
It appears that contract drafters ignore non-contractual norms when
designing contracts, which leads to tension during the contractual rela-
tionship. In earlier work I identified a number of non-contractual factors
that influence parties actions but rarely find a place in contracts
(Kamminga 2008; 2011). These non-contractual drivers influence con-
tract parties’ behavior and can, in fact, encourage parties to act contrary
to what the contract text directs them to do. This article takes a problem
solving approach: it studies the dynamic between various drivers of con-
tractual behavior more in-depth, and looks into the drivers triggering or
impeding evolution in contract design. I discuss why and how lawyers
may better manage tensions and prevent disputes by revising their con-
tract design methods and choices (and how to convince them to do so).
What follows is a discussion of the dynamic interplay between the
formal and informal governance mechanisms at work in every long-term
relationship. In addressing this matter, this paper points out (a) why law-
yers experience very little incentive to search for ways to improve the
cooperation function of contracts; (b) how to overcome these obstacles;
and (c) how to integrate social and economic drivers to increase the
effectiveness of contracts. To this end, a framework is put forward that
might be used to (1) identify tensions between formal and informal gover-
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nance structures in actual contracts and (2) provide a roadmap for
contract design that foreshadows and possibly eliminates some of these
tensions during the contract drafting process. This article aims to contrib-
ute to a broader discussion of more effective ways in which transaction
lawyers can contribute to society and, more specifically, the paper
explores how a more holistic approach to contract design may help pre-
vent conflict and achieve better results for contract parties.
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INTRODUCTION
Our contractual relations are governed by a variety of norms and
rules. The laws to which we are subject, the economic interests we hold,
the social rules that govern our society, the nuances unique to each inter-
action, and elements that we invent as we go along all comprise these
norms and rules. Together, they determine how we interact and cooper-
ate. At the core of the network of formal and informal governance
mechanisms are the arrangements between the main parties laid down
in contracts. This core is what lawyers and many parties tend to focus on,
almost exclusively, when negotiating and enforcing contracts.
The flaw that so often undermines contracts is that they do not
seem up to the task of dealing with the complexities of today’s long term
contractual relationships. Frequently, contract documents are unable to
help parties get the process related to their collaboration back on track.
Not only do written agreements routinely fail to keep parties on course
when they have a disagreement, contracts themselves are often sus-
pected and identified as the cause of problems. It appears that their
active use as governance instruments may increase the chances of a
breakdown of cooperation. There is ample evidence to confirm that
instead of functioning as guideposts for the contract parties, the ideal
represented in contract literature, contracts, in practice, often disrupt the
collaboration process and undermine the contractual relationship.
Empirical research reinforces this negative view of contracts. Stud-
ies show that parties are not fond of contracts as tools for keeping their
cooperation on track (Passera et al. 2013). Some studies even suggest
that complex contracts are alienating those that could make them a
success (Malhotra 2012). When contract managers are asked about
their experience with construction contracts, they often identify them as
inadequate and as the starting point for disagreements. What they are
missing is clear guidance for dealing with the consequences of, for
instance, unexpected events or changes (Stephenson 1996: 11;
Kamminga 2008). Whenever unexpected circumstances arise, initially,
parties tend to dig in; they either hide behind the contract or point at lacu-
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nae in the agreement. A supplier may use the contract as justification for
change orders as they are asked to act in ways not specified in the con-
tract. The purchaser, at the same time, may try to use that same contract
to enforce penalties triggered by delays to the schedules as a result of
discussion about whether change orders are justified. In this particular
context, vague or punitive contract language can create an adversarial
dynamic; it often fuels disputes that can lead to costly and uncertain liti-
gation (Triantis 2013).
For those parties that try to maintain a collaborative atmosphere,
the contract is of little use, and such parties rely on alternatives. Mostly,
other informal mechanisms are used such as reputation or reciprocity.
They are the main drivers in parties’ dealings with each other (Macaulay
1963; Malhotra, 2012). However, these mechanisms only suffice as long
as parties are able to resolve issues using the applicable non-contractual
norms. As soon as differences of opinion arise that compel parties to take
legal positions, non-contractual mechanisms fail and all that parties are
left with is the contract. This slide toward conflict creates an uncomfort-
able situation because what is essential for the success of any long-term
contractual relation – how parties will collaboratively achieve their goals
– is not given a solid structure in contracting and contracts.
An interesting paradox has become evident. Our goal with con-
tracts – at least in most Western countries – is to ensure that the other
party will actually do what was initially promised, yet seem disinclined to
carefully study what drives these parties apart and disrupts their contrac-
tual arrangements.1 As a result of this gap in our inquiry, contract parties
continue to be exposed to myriad, disruptive forces that contracts fail to
address. These unexamined forces often have the capacity to under-
mine the chance of parties actually having a successful contractual
relationship.
The remainder of this article discusses key factors that determine
parties’ contractual behavior. The objective is to further clarify how ignor-
ing these forces at play in contracts may be harmful. The article will then
analyze what possible avenues can be explored to design contracts that
better cater to parties that want contracts to serve as guideposts for the
cooperation process.
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1. There are of course other economic mechanisms at work in a sector that make parties
life up to promises that are not specified in the contract, such as reputation mechanisms
or a strong sense of obedience to social norms, but these not always apply or have the
expected result, see Bernstein 2001, and Elickson 1991.
Part I briefly discusses the purpose of contracts in contract design
literature and identifies the key role of contracts as studied in empirical
research, as well as the problems that impact contracts as cooperation
mechanisms. I will further outline how by disregarding the economic and
social force-field in which parties operate most current contracting prac-
tices fail to furnish parties with the guidance required to manage the ups
and downs of complex long-term contractual relations. It then goes on to
argue why contract literature teaches us little about facilitating coopera-
tion and how lawyers experience little incentive to design cooperative
contracts. Part II highlights what we can learn from scholars studying
contractual behavior and how contracts and other drivers influence con-
tract party behavior. To that end, I discuss some of the drivers that
influence contract parties’ behavior within their contractual dealings.
Part III calls for a revisited contract design strategy, one that facilitates
cooperation through contracts. I examine what lawyers, as designers of
contracts, may do differently to improve contracts. I explore how, by
using the insights from Part II, contracts could be designed more effec-
tively by seriously considering the dynamic interrelationship between
contractual arrangements and other non-formal mechanisms. The les-
sons drawn from this approach may offer some footholds for lawyers
looking for ways to devise contracts that empower parties to understand
and anticipate the forces that drive contractual relations. The approach
enables the design contracts that better harness those forces through
paying particular attention to the interaction between the norms set
forth in contracts and other non-legal norms that drive contract behavior.
Part IV points out possible obstacles for effective implementation and
presents ways in which they may be overcome.
I. LITERATURE REVIEW
To set the stage for a discussion of the incentives lawyers experi-
ence when designing contracts, I briefly introduce the main forces at
work. This part discusses the reasons we enter into contracts in the first
place. It explores the directions provided to contract drafters by contract
law and practice, contract literature and our legal education. It also
explains why the current structure hardly incentivizes lawyers to devise
contracts that facilitate cooperation.
A. Interdisciplinary views of contracts function and cooperation
Contracts are valued as essential governance structures, indis-
pensable in facilitating cooperation in contractual relations. Contract
researchers and practitioners alike, however, tend to focus on control
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and enforcement in order to guarantee cooperation. They often fail to
consider strategies as a means of actively nurturing cooperative behav-
ior (Passera et al. 2013; Malhotra & Lumineau 2011).
The legal and economic branches of contract (design) literature
have rather limited views of the purpose of contracts. The legal per-
spective on the purpose of contracts focuses almost uniquely on
enforceability – a contract allows a party to go to court and impose on the
other party what was agreed and thereby prevent contractual breach.2
From this perspective, the contract occupies the role of tool or, more
accurately, weapon. Its serves one party against the other; it does not
reconcile parties and shepherd them in the direction of mutual benefit or
shared goals.
Economists take a somewhat broader perspective. They view con-
tracts as tools that allow for the operation of the market as well as the
allocation of risk. Basically, contracts help people to rely on promises
made by others, the performance of which lies in the future (Triantis
2000; Posner 2001; Shavell 2004). Some economists along with man-
agement scholars regard contracts as also having an information
function. In this view, contracts have a function as a resource, a docu-
ment in which parties lay down what they originally agreed upon so that
they may consult the document later (Shavell 2004).
Only a few economic and legal scholars mention that contracts also
function as a framework that governs the relationship between the two
organizations (firms) (Gulati 1995; Oxley 1997; Ryall & Sampson 2003;
MacNeil 1999). A small area of empirical economic literature suggests
that contracts describe what the collaboration process between parties
should look like.3 Inspired by studies in practice, they argue that con-
tracts may be drafted as frameworks that go beyond purely legal
documents.4 This view suggests that contracts may be «blueprints for
exchange» and a means to plan the collaboration. It further intimates that
contracts may serve to set the expectations of all partners involved
and consequently reduce misunderstandings and costly missteps
(Kamminga 2008; 2015).
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2. Courts seem to reinforce this (Gilson et al. 2013).
3. Macaulay (1963) is the first – and still influential – empirical study of contracts and rela-
tionships in businesses. He deals with the question when contracts are necessary
(when terms of agreements were complex, when repeat dealings were unlikely, when
the size or organization of the firm meant that employee who executed the deal needed
a formal vehicle to communicate its terms to other members of the firm).
4. See Ryall and Sampson (2003: 4) (doing empirical research on over 40 technology alli-
ances).
The angle taken by most contract theorists is, however, to look at
contracts solely as mechanisms that incentivize people to cooperate
solely by means of the threat of enforcement, i.e. the contract as a
weapon. Traditional contract theory focuses on incentivizing parties to
follow through on promises, mainly by using formal mechanisms (such
as written contracts). Much of legal contract scholarship focuses on con-
tracts as formal enforcement mechanisms – enforceability being the
incentive for parties to voluntarily live up to the contract, or ‘cooperate.’
Relational contract theorists also tend to discuss cooperation as a result
of enforcing promises. The factor differentiating the relational theory with
traditional contract theory is that these scholars primarily focus on the
non-contractual concerns for maintaining the relationship. They focus on
studding the informal mechanisms that incentivize contract parties to
refrain from contractual breach (Macaulay 1963; MacNeil 1980; 1999).
All of these are tools that allow for private sanctions, which keep breach
of promises at bay (Gilson et al. 2010). Examples of informal contracting
mechanisms that have a strong enforcement aspect are tit-for-tat strate-
gies (Axelrod 1986), or social norms type mechanisms such as
reputation, and reciprocity mechanisms that incentivize people to act
cooperatively as opposed to pure self interest driven behavior.
The empirical management literature also finds that contracts
strongly focus on enforcement. It divides contract terms between those
that have either a control function and those that serve a coordination
function (Furlotti & Grandori 2010; Malhotra & Lumineau 2011). Coordi-
nation clauses cover the division of tasks and responsibilities; they are
meant to enhance monitoring and coordination. Control clauses are
about mitigating risks of opportunism and typically include decision and
termination rights (Schepker et al. 2014). Furlotti et al. find that most of
the terms in contracts have a control function. It appears that the majority
of contracts utilize very few coordination type terms that facilitate the
cooperation process. In general, contract drafters tend to spend most of
their time and effort on making the contract an effective control and
enforcement tool. This approach develops a document that anticipates
conflict and is intended to be wielded protectively or offensively by one
party against the other. This preparation for failure is the very spirit of the
contract, not facilitating and sustaining a cooperative relationship that
moves parties toward the goals that necessitated the contract in the first
place.
Organizing cooperation is mostly done by informal rather than by
formal governance mechanisms. The only real reference to cooperative
behavior one can commonly find in contracts is a ‘good faith’ provision
that provides broad standards of appropriate behavior in contracts
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(Reiter 1983; Thomas 2012). What these provisions mean is subject to
interpretation, which makes them hard to enforce. Empirical researchers
have found that some firms, however, do include contractual terms that
are hard to enforce legally (Gulati 1995; Oxley 1997; Sampson 2003;
Ryall & Sampson 2003). An advantage of this approach is that it not only
helps parties in their relationship but, as a legal document, it also pro-
vides guidance to the courts on the partner intentions, should their
process of collaboration break down. It helps a judge or other neutral
party to understand the context in which to interpret the terms of a con-
tract and the parties’ actions should a case be brought before him (Gilson
et al. 2012).
The fact that limited attention is paid to cooperation in contract
design triggers debate outside the legal world but not so much in main-
stream contract literature. Until now, the legal and economic literature
that addresses the limits of complex contracts has remained focused pri-
marily on traditional subjects and how courts deal with legal concepts,
consequences of contractual incompleteness, and problems resulting
from differences in interpretation (Gilson et al. 2014). Relational theorists
have taken an opposite approach. They have mostly stressed the impor-
tance of informal governance mechanisms in organizing the parties’
cooperation process. In neither of these main branches in contract litera-
ture has much attention been paid to how contracts can go or perhaps
should go beyond their traditional role as enforcement mechanisms and
take the responsibility of actively facilitating and streamlining coopera-
tion – in other words, making contracts better at inviting cooperative
behavior.
Yet, other disciplines have hinted at it. Some have signaled the
poor track record of contracts and identified the absence of flexibility as a
problem that generates tension (Malhotra 2012). Contracts that neglect
the facilitation of inter-party cooperation establish a tension that is driven
by rigidness of contracts, on the one hand, and the need for flexibility in
doing business. Flexibility is considered necessary particularly in cases
where non-routine tasks are frequently organized into projects. Infra-
structure projects may be the ultimate example.5 Management and
organization studies research shows that formalization is quite generally
believed to be in contrast with flexibility and innovation, often frustrating
adaptability (Furlotti & Grandori 2010). Under conditions where high
degrees of uncertainty prevail, contracts are considered to be inade-
quate. The costs of writing and enforcing contracts is substantial
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5. Flexibility refers to the reconfiguration capacity of a system in the face of changing and
unforeseeable circumstances (Piore and Sabel 1984; Volberda 1998).
whereas the parties can be affected in unpredictable ways by countless
contingencies that traditional contracts cannot resolve (Williamson
1979).
Empirical studies into the effects of contracts confirm this negative
picture. Initial findings suggested contracts were almost by default harm-
ful, although more recently this literature has started to nuance its
negative image of contracts (Goo, Kishore, Rao, & Nam, 2009). Origi-
nally contracts were considered not only inadequate but even
detrimental and undermining other governance mechanisms. Formal
contracting was seen as weakening relational arrangements by signal-
ing distrust or non-expectance of reciprocity, which in turn motivates
opportunism (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Macaulay, 1963). Similarly, the
presence of relational arrangements was considered to marginalize
costly and inflexible formal contracting (Dyer 1997; Macaulay 1963;
Macneil 1980; Zajac & Olsen 1993).
Yet, more recently, a growing body of theoretical and empirical
work sees possibilities for contracts as cooperation tools. Some suggest
that relational and contractual mechanisms not only coexist but also
enable and complement each other (Goo, Kishore, Rao, & Nam, 2009;
Luo, 2002; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Ryall & Sampson 2009). This
research suggests that firms are unwilling to engage in incomplete con-
tracts in the absence of relational norms and trust (Lorenz, 1999; Poppo
& Zenger 2002). Concurrently, contracting reinforces informal arrange-
ments by establishing the norms of collaboration and enriching partners’
understanding of each other’s assumptions, expectations, and business
processes (Luo, 2002; Ryall & Sampson, 2009). In other words, con-
tracts are not inherently harmful but can, if well designed, directly or
indirectly lead to cooperation in the context of other governance
structures.
The need for a wider governance structure to support the commit-
ment to cooperative behavior seems paramount. Empirical studies of
large construction projects indicate that commitment at the organiza-
tional level and contractual procedures or non-contractual norms are
essential (Nystrom 2005). The lack of that support is a serious threat to
cooperation success (Stephenson 1996 and Barlow et al. 2003). Threats
to establishing cooperation originate in different areas. Some emerge in
the implementation of the concepts in an organization; others in the legal
uncertainty these forms create, and some arise in the margins set by, for
instance, procurement laws. These threats together may frustrate the
early implementation of relational contracting (Kamminga 2008; Triantis
2013).
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Abstract notions of cooperation that are not well embedded in con-
tracts can cause misunderstandings on an organizational and legal
level. Often, these notions are different from the terms used in more tradi-
tional contracts. If the concepts are not translated into legally
enforceable terms, implementation can lead to legal disputes regarding
intended meaning. Barlow et al. note: «(T)he difficulty is that there is little
common ground between a fully-fledged partnering agreement, which
embodies notions of good faith, and a traditional style contract, which
preserves the self-interest of each party» (Jones 2003). Contracts
mostly deal with remedies and penalties for noncompliance. Enforce-
ment of cooperation principles is also considered to be a problem (Cox
and Thompson 1996). From a contractual point of view, a cooperative
contract may, in some cases, be considered non-binding or too vague to
be enforceable (Van den Berg & Kamminga 2006).
In short, current contracts are still predominantly focused on their
control and not so much on their coordination (or cooperation) function,
which leads to problems in contracting practice. But there is reason for
optimism. The good news is that recent studies indicate that contracts do
have the potential to become better cooperation mechanisms. Empirical
scholars have found that formal and informal governance mechanisms
can strengthen each other. They have identified a number of contracting
directions in practice that in fact integrate both formal and informal gover-
nance mechanisms (Gilson et al. 2010). However, to move from isolated
attempts to make cooperation part of contractual governance towards a
truly integrated contract design approach that fosters cooperation, and
eventually contract design theory that embraces the non-contractual
mechanisms, the lawyers as drafters of contracts, need to be onboard.
Lawyers’ attitude towards this type of contract innovation is likely to be
pivotal for the development of cooperation in contract law. To get a better
sense of whether current frameworks will make them favorable to such
changes, I next turn to the main drivers likely to influence a legal profes-
sional drafting behavior.
B. Lawyers as Designers of Contracts
What about lawyers and the extent to which they are focused on
developing cooperative governance structures? Despite the fact that
cooperation breakdowns have arisen for years, there has been very little
innovation in contracts aimed at mitigating this flaw (Triantis 2013).
Research shows that in some industries parties are desperately looking
for new ways to collaborate more effectively and safeguard against dis-
ruptions of their business relations by innovating the ways in which they
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cooperate (Gilson et al. 2010). Yet, contracts do not seem to integrate
these trends. Lawyers still tend to focus on writing contracts to enforce
promises and manage risks with very little devoted to the role of con-
tracts as facilitators of cooperation. In fact, contract drafters tend to
actively refrain from designing contracts that are attuned to the necessity
of pro-actively encouraging cooperation, as these terms have no real
legal meaning. Apparently, lawyers, as contract-designers, are not
incentivized to make contracts the optimal cooperation platforms in the
sense discussed above. Thus, governance structures that facilitate
cooperative behavior do not automatically emanate from the common
frames of reference applied by lawyers. If that were the case, legal pro-
fessionals would be naturally encouraged to add more cooperative
terms in contracts. If no one specifically asks lawyers to integrate them
into contracts, non-contractual mechanisms, it is safe to assume, will be
largely ignored.
First, no one can deny that the lawyer’s role in contracting is an
important one. Transactional lawyers are often responsible for the type
and language of the contract. Most business negotiations eventually
involve lawyers, and if a deal results, the outcome is translated into con-
tracts. The lawyer’s role in these deals entails either drafting or revising
an agreement, (re-)negotiating the conditions of an existing agreement,
or resolving a conflict that arose during the contractual relationship
(Kamminga 2011; Triantis 2013). They may not be the decision makers
where the content of the business deal is concerned, but as designers of
contracts, lawyers have an important say in the legal agreement’s look
and feel. Thus, analyzing the incentives at play in the drafting contracts
and hammering out the language can help us understand why most
agreements feature very little language that is focused on facilitating
cooperation.
Lawyers serve as both the designers and interpreters of contracts.
Two types of lawyers divide up these tasks – those who work on transac-
tions and those who specialize in litigation. The role of the first group of
lawyers is – among others – the (re)negotiation and drafting of contracts.
This is the group we focus on here; these are the lawyers who design
contracts.
Understanding the frame of reference that transactional lawyers
apply when making contract design decisions gives us insight into their
decisions regarding the exact terms and language they choose or nego-
tiate. I distinguish among four types of rules lawyers are bound by or take
as guidance.
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The first three important sets of rules that one may assume influ-
ence a lawyer’s decision making are ethical rules of behavior, the rules of
contract law, and the directions provided by the literature on contracts
and lawyers’ roles in drafting. Comprising the fourth of these ‘rules’, the
lawyer’s own personal views will direct him in his drafting work, informing
what a contract should entail and how he defines his role in its develop-
ment. Together, these four rules or norm sets tend to drive the lawyers in
their contract design.
The first and most important set of guidelines followed by lawyers
are the ethical rules. In the literature, a lawyer’s professional responsibil-
ity in negotiating contracts has been loosely typified as fulfilling the role of
advocate, educator, wordsmith, and scribe (Duhl 2010). The ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct provide lawyers – with significant leeway
– some concrete direction in fulfilling their ethical obligations with respect
to drafting and negotiating contracts (Menkel Meadow 1999; Salbu 1995;
Stark 2007). It basically stipulates a duty to facilitate exchange and pro-
mote trust, and underscore that promises will be enforceable. Based on
these rules, lawyers have duties to their own clients in the drafting pro-
cess, protecting them from fraud and discouraging them from engaging
in reckless behavior.6 The transactional lawyer should avoid ambiguous
or vague language and identify ambiguity in contracts drafted by the
other side. All in all, these ethical rules furnish lawyers with significant
freedom in their design. Despite the duty to facilitate exchange and pro-
mote trust, lawyers seem to focus most on the last criterion, making sure
that promises will be enforceable.
A second baseline principle in contract design can be derived from
statutes and common law. In terms of what lawyers have to deliver when
drafting and forming contracts, only the basics are provided for. The con-
tract includes the primary components for contract formation: offer and
acceptance, consideration and the essential terms such as parties,
quantity, date of delivery and payment terms, and statutory and judicial
interpretations of key terms. A drafter also has to prevent including con-
flicting terms concerning material items.7 Adding to this, some contracts
are illegal or unenforceable. For instance, when they involve an agree-
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6. Duhl distinguishes three situations: (a) the lawyer who knowingly or recklessly drafts
false representations; (b) fraud, conscious ambiguity, and errors in transcription by the
lawyer or opposing lawyer; and (c) the lawyer who knowingly drafts an invalid contract
provision.
7. Roosevelt U. v. Mayfair Constr. Co., 331 N.E.2d 835, 845-846 (Ill. App. 1975). In this
case one provision made an architect’s decisions subject to arbitration and another pro-
vision stated the architect’s decision was final and conclusive, see M.H. Sam Jacob-
son, “A Checklist for Drafting Good Contracts” (2008) 5 J. ALWD 79-177.
ment to commit a crime or turn out to be so detrimental to one side that a
party in their full mind would never have agreed to it, contracts become
unenforceable. Nonetheless, apart from relatively strict rules for forma-
tion, invalidation and enforceability of contracts, much freedom is
provided to the drafter.
A third source providing guidance to lawyers’ in their contract
design tasks is legal contract theory. Legal contract theorists have dis-
cussed the roles of lawyers as legal advisors of their clients and as
influencers of contract design. Some authors have focused on the role of
lawyers as contract makers, and many others have written books on how
lawyers ought to negotiate or draft a solid contract. According to Ian
MacNeil, the largest single segment of the business of the American law-
yer is planning contractual transactions and relations (MacNeil 1975;
MacNeil & Gudel 2001). In this literature, the primary tasks of transaction
lawyers are identified as advising, documenting, negotiating and pro-
cessing (Coates 2012). The language and terms of the contract in the
more complex transactions discussed in this article are mulled over; lan-
guage is suggested, drafted, modified and re-negotiated. Ronald Gilson
introduced the term «transaction-cost engineers» for lawyers who effi-
ciently add value to their clients and provide for well-designed contracts
(Gilson 1984).
The literature also includes «how-to» books for lawyers, writings on
good lawyering, contract drafting guides, and popular literature explain-
ing what lawyers do and why (Chomsky & Landsman 2000; Gold &
Bubela 2007; Stark 2007). Along with standard forms that have been
developed for specific industries or by law firms, this literature probably
exerts the strongest influence on how contracts get written. It finds appli-
cation in standard contracts used in house by law firms, is made
available via contract databases, or is built into the products of industry
standards setting, such as the contracts developed by the American
Institute of Architects. When making contracts from scratch some
authors suggest using a checklist to help the drafter to be more efficient
and avoid reinventing the wheel each time (Jacobson 2008).
Other authors go beyond the strictly legal aspects of contracts and
champion for good writing and for tailoring contracts to the client’s spe-
cific business. In order to live up to the duties of drafting adequate
contracts, these authors stipulate that in addition to good legal knowl-
edge, clear organization and good writing abilities are required in order to
tailor a contract to the specific circumstances (Jacobson 2008). Usability
and clarity are criteria by which to evaluate contracts. A contract should
also withstand the test of a «bad faith» reading or a hostile audience.
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Finally, it is advised to review the contract on a regular basis to be certain
it continues to meet the needs of parties. Here, the lawyer who is recep-
tive may consider implementing terms that help the business side to
achieve its goals. The focus is, however, mostly on writing clear terms,
and fulfilling the typical requirements of an enforceable contract.
Thus, we can conclude that the drafters of contracts are encour-
aged to primarily look to heed the objectives of the parties involved while
protecting the interests of their client at the same time (Masten 2000). In
doing so, the drafter will try to provide for all contingencies by predicting
a series of outcomes. Each contract is unique and involves specific
concerns, but it also involves many common requirements and consider-
ations. Some clear design directions are given in books, and form
contracts are common, even for highly complex transactions (Gulati &
Scott 2012).
The fourth type of reference points lawyers rely on in their contract
design work consists of their personal views on what contracts should
provide. There are different schools of thought here. Where one group of
lawyers seems to focus uniquely on giving their clients the best possible
legal cover, others go a step further in designing contracts and also place
a high value on goal alignment. The first group likely focuses on risk allo-
cation and indemnities.8 The latter group will see the creation of a
mechanism that facilitates cooperation not conflict, as the purpose of
contract negotiations. Ian MacNeil describes this latter concept as con-
tract planning (MacNeil 1975). The first group of lawyers will tend to take
a one-sided perspective and focus almost exclusively on ways to allo-
cate risk away from the client. The latter group is most likely to consider
the object of the deal as part of their design efforts. MacNeil describes
the planning job as establishing a framework for handling unplanned
aspects of the relationship. Two processes are essential to such contract
planning: determining the parties’ goals along as well as the related
costs of their attainment. This approach to contract design includes iden-
tifying clients’ explicit and implicit goals and the risks they are willing to
assume.9 The contract that results from these considerations will provide
for procedures to deal with those risks.
Based on this review of the guidelines and rules that apply to con-
tract drafting, one can conclude that rules governing the contract drafting
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8. Empirical studies support this by showing that the time spent on negotiating contracts is
mostly spent on terms in these areas.
9. McNeil (1975) (The first category being goals to be included in the contract and the sec-
ond category to develop a good understanding of the clients’ way of doing business).
process lead to the development of instruments that one-sidedly serve
the enforcement task of contracts. This role of the contract also appears
to be the dominant view and practice among lawyers. Few concrete
incentives or practicable suggestions are available for lawyers to call
upon in order to draft contracts that fulfill the task of actively facilitating
cooperation via contracts. In all likelihood, the absence of this practice
can be attributed to a lack of legal incentives and to the fact that lawyers
simply do not see the framing and facilitating or cooperation as their task.
It is not what they are paid to do or to be. Above all, any diversion from the
current practices bring with it risks and potential push-back. Whether a
lawyer is inclined to incorporate provisions meant to organize coopera-
tion largely depends on his personal views – whether he perceives the
contract solely as a transactional and protective instrument or has a
broader appreciation of the contract’s ability to sustain goal-focused
cooperation. As it is, only a minority of those lawyers who feel personally
compelled to write cooperative contracts may do so, but there is little that
drives lawyers to make such an approach the standard (Levine 2002).
Two additional factors complicate maintaining a cooperative
approach in contract design. First, contract drafting is a process under-
taken by lawyers on both sides. So, if the other side is more tradition
bound or conservative, the cooperative terms may be the first ones to be
eliminated in the drafting process. Second, and more importantly, often-
times, clients share their lawyers’ narrow views of contracts and fail to
see the opportunities to implement cooperative mechanisms. As the
value of having such contracts may be underestimated, parties may
instead opt for standardized contract terms.10 Supporting and integrating
requires cooperative terms demands a real willingness and determina-
tion.
Should we then simply give up on contracts as cooperation devices
and hope that the non-contractual dimensions, often the core of why the
parties have established a relationship, will manage to work themselves
out, even as relationships grow more complex? The earlier research on
the role and effects of contracts suggests that maintaining the status quo
may be the best approach. More recent research is more optimistic with
respect to the future of contracts as instruments that frame and facilitate
cooperation. Those studies indicate we should set aside those conclu-
sions that push against the idea that contracts cannot be designed to
foster cooperation, or that other mechanisms are superior. Empirical evi-
dence suggests that a contract complements such non-contractual
mechanisms and may even fulfill a positive role in need to enable coop-
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10. See Triantis (2013) on the tendency to opt for standard contracts as cost reduction
measure, and the concern of clients of being ‘over-lawyered’.
eration. Some have studied this combination and support that these
mechanisms (contractual and non-contractual) are in fact complemen-
tary and not mutually exclusive. Further supportive, a number of authors
have infused a level of creativity and see it as their mission to design con-
tracts that help both in relationship planning and facilitating cooperation
(Levine 2002).
This little shift towards considering and designing contracts that ful-
fill this dual purpose can open lawyers to the idea of helping contract
parties to design contracts that better serve their users. It can be the start
of nudging lawyers to better serve their clients’ relationship and coopera-
tive needs. The evolving and emerging interplay of contract parties is
presenting a framework that may convince lawyers that including
cooperative terms in contracts is not only attractive and feasible, but
necessary as well.
II. LESSONS FROM THEORY AND PRACTICE – ABOUT
DRIVERS OF CONTRACTUAL BEHAVIOR
In exploring how to integrate non-contractual mechanisms into
contract design, we first need to understand the interplay between con-
tracts and the other factors that influence behavior.
A. How to trigger contractual innovation
Innovation arises as a result of ‘shocks to the system’; these
shocks be brought about by learning or as a result of clients requesting
new or modified services. For instance, a new law is passed, changing
what is required of parties, or a court decides to read into a typical con-
tract clause something different than other courts before it. Lawyers
generally respond by adjusting their clients’ contracts. Very few lawyers
are inclined to spontaneously tinker with the mechanics or objectives of
contracts. So, they need to be nudged to explore new avenues. Perhaps
the only motivating imperative would be a direct request from a client to
change a contract or provide for something specific modification or inno-
vation. What we can surmise from the foregoing and from the current
professional practice is that the chance that cooperative contracts will
spontaneously result is slim. Even with the tensions and discontinuities
driven by the assessable need for contract innovation that is matched to
innovations in business needs and strategy, in the short term, this is not
something that holds priority for lawyers. The need for contracts that
nurture cooperation may be evident, but in practice, there may be
insufficient how-to knowledge outside of a few cutting edge sectors.
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The ensuing question becomes how to trigger the type of contrac-
tual innovation that will lead to more cooperative contracts, contracts that
take into account non-contractual dynamics. Lawyers may need a gentle
push to be motivated to explore a workable strategy for practicing this
approach. Foster a new contracting approach necessitates a better
understanding of contracting behavior, its dynamics, and the undermin-
ing effects of our current system. A brief discussion can furnish insight
into how different norms impact behavior and affect the achievement
contract goals. It can also show how tensions can arise as these norms
compete with each other.
The potential practical benefits of having contracts that support
cooperation, along with the theoretical basis for their potential, under-
score the need to examine functional cooperative contract design more
closely. An examination of the literature focusing on contractual behavior
provides some direction.
B. Contractual behavior
The design of most contracts seems to be based on a misconcep-
tion or an oversimplification of how they influence behavior. They appear
to be written in somewhat of a legal theoretical vacuum, as if their sub-
stance drives all parties’ decisions. This position or approach brings with
it the assumption that the contract ‘controls’ parties’ behavior. To that
end, parties’ legal obligations constitute the framework of the contract.
Clearly, reality is different. People’s inclinations and behaviors are not
the result of the language of the contract (Simonin 1997). In practice,
real, tangible rivalry between informal and formal mechanisms can be
found in projects, where informal rules may be pushed aside by the
contract or contracts may push against informal rules of cooperation
(Kamminga 2015).
These tensions between governance mechanisms can be illus-
trated as follows. For instance, in construction development projects,
how a contractor in a contractual relationship behaves vis-à-vis the
purchaser on the other side depends on several factors or types of moti-
vational drivers. Consider the perspective of an entrepreneur; a first
driver will be economic interests such as improving cash flow and gar-
nering market share. A second set of drivers is embedded in social
norms, best practices or customs of the construction sector, and in the
informal agreements the contract parties’ representatives make among
themselves. A final set of rules that will guide a contractor in his coopera-
tion with the other party are the legal norms laid down in the contract. The
sum of these sets of norms – or behavioral drivers – together determines
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how contract partners behave and how they judge others’ behavior
(Collins 1999).
Contractual behavior literature is a relatively small field that exam-
ines contracts as cooperation mechanisms. It is worthy of greater
exploration for three reasons: First, there is the general assumption that
contracts are ultimately meant to guide contract parties in their behavior
towards each other and in their efforts to complete the contract goals.
Second, the dissatisfaction with current contracts warrants a closer
examination of optimized contract design. Third, this literature clearly
shows both the importance of considering non-contractual dimensions
when giving thought designing contracts and the dangers of failing to do
so. The literature helps to illustrate and highlight the potentially adverse
effects of contracts in relationship to other factors influencing the con-
tracting parties’ behavior. Also of importance, it clarifies how contracts
can be used to their greatest benefit.
The contractual behavior literature is helpful in thinking through
and analyzing the tensions that can arise between the norms set forth in
contracts and other non-legal norms. These tensions are particularly
problematic in complex long-term contracts, which are by nature incom-
plete and where other mechanisms are often desperately needed to
keep projects on track. Scholars studying contractual behavior have
investigated these norms and derived just how the tensions between
norms may undermine cooperative behavior between clients and con-
tractors and become a source of conflict and disappointing results.
The literature on contractual behavior identifies a number of drivers
of behavior, ranging from the contract itself to social norms to economic
incentives (Collins 1999). For instance, in construction contracting,
these behavioral drivers consist largely of laws, regulations, and project
management, but they also include more abstract structures such as cul-
ture, social norms, and customs unique to the industry (Williamson
2004). The argument is that behavior of contractual parties is influenced
by the sum of the various normative structures that apply.
A rivalry between the norms can be derived from this literature. Col-
lins (and others) investigates these norms and derives how the rivalry
between them may undermine cooperative behavior between parties,
becoming a source of conflict that trigger disappointing results. These
findings are in line with the experience, in practice, of contract drafting
and with what is suggested through interviews with people regarding
their experience with contracts (IIACM 2011).
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Currently, contract drafters try to reinforce behavior that is in line
with the contract by providing one, the other, or both of the following:
economic bonuses for living up to the contract and economic penalties
for failure to comply with the contract (Bajari & Tadelis 2001). This
reward-punishment feature may correct some of the tendencies that can
go against the contract, but it can neither manage nor eliminate all. For
instance, a construction contract may appeal to some economic drivers
felt by a supplier of goods. Examples are liquidated damage clauses
(penalties for being late) or savings-sharing clauses (bonuses for saving
costs) that speak to the economic level. However, it’s hit and miss as
some but not all economic drivers will be considered in contracts or are
not sufficiently appealing to really steer behavior. Even with the inclusion
of these drivers in the contract, the social norms and best practices that
parties develop over time are also not likely to be specified in the contract
document. So, as soon as a party decides not to follow through on the
terms of the agreement, resulting either from economic or relational
reasons, the contract loses its effectiveness – often despite the bonuses
and penalties. Breaking a contractual promise and risking legal conse-
quences can be a more attractive option, particularly when legal
enforcement is costly, when the survival of a company is at stake, or
when social norms suggest a breach of the contract, especially where
the relationship has reached an impasse and trust is damaged.
Not only does having an enforceable contract present limits, the
contract may lead to unwanted side-effects by interfering with the posi-
tive effects of economic and relational norms, resulting in missed
opportunities (Poppo & Zenger 2002).
Again, tension between these norms would not be a problem if the
circumstances were such that parties could simply be forced to do what
the contract stipulates. That would make the contract the dominant rule
set and the main driver of contractual behavior. Unfortunately, complex
contracts are limited in their ability to effectively enforce behavior for the
variety of reasons referenced above (Crocker & Reynolds 1993). As a
consequence, the contract is, on paper, the primary regulatory instru-
ment, but, because it ignores the other dimensions, it does not provide a
solution. As a result, different rules or norms enter into application in the
contractual relationship between the parties. These non-contract rules
drive the parties’ behavior and may conflict with each other.
The existence of competition between various sets of rules is par-
ticularly relevant from the cooperation perspective taken in this article.
These rule sets can be at the basis of a variety of contract management
issues such as process problems and relationship issues (misunder-
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standings, lack of cooperation, poor communication, and conflict).
Those issues are problematic in a number of ways. First of all, when one
party lives by one set of rules and the other by a different set a likely mis-
match in contractual behavior can arise and tensions are the result.
Second, having different views on which set of rules should apply directly
undermines the process of coordination and interaction, an essential
success factor in long-term business relationships.
This analysis suggests that there may be a better approach to writ-
ing contracts, one that does not proceed by building them almost entirely
with control type provisions while ignoring the non-contractual mecha-
nisms. The general response to incomplete contracts or correcting
behavior has not resolved this tension. Neither adding incentives to
strengthen contractual enforceability nor simply relying on informal
mechanisms to carry cooperation process provides much certainty to
parties involved in long-term agreements. This absence of both coopera-
tive contract design and effective behavior incentives is becoming
particularly impeding in an ever more complex and specialized econ-
omy, where parties are often forced to join forces, enter into partnerships
or joint ventures. Sooner or later, the normative systems will interfere
with each other. A more promising approach, it would appear, is to try to
plan for better coordination between parties and assign non-contractual
norms a place in the contractual framework.
III. DESIGNING THREE DIMENSIONAL CONTRACTS
In this section I will take a somewhat different approach to contract
design. Instead of taking the more traditional approach starting at a ‘stan-
dard contract’ and tweaking it, I propose an approach that first diagnoses
what the specific contractual relationship needs, what the likely dynamic
will be, and what type of design best fits that situation.
Today’s contracts tend to artificially reduce the complexity of
associations and social relations. Such an oversimplification of reality,
however, has its downsides, as we have seen – ignoring other normative
structures can become a threat to the coordination process. As contract
parties also rely on other frames of reference to decide what actions to
take and how to judge the other’s behavior, the contract can undermine
its own capacity to guide parties effectively and may disrupt cooperation.
In other words, the purely contractual perspective ignores much of the
context in which the agreement was made, how it fits into the ongoing
relationship, how it affects others, and how it impacts sentiments of trust
and loyalty. The only other solution for improving contracts so that they
facilitate cooperation and deal with tensions between normative frame-
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works is to design contracts that take these other dimensions into
account.
A. Inclusive contracts for a modern contractual environment
The presence of other normative systems may be disturbing from
the ideal legal perspective, but they are often useful from the perspective
of cooperation, particularly in complex endeavors where contracts are
almost by default incomplete and where economic stakes are high. In
such contexts, these other norms may be helpful; their inclusion can
serve to fill in the blanks. So instead of reasoning them away, drafters
may want to learn about them and embrace them to make their contracts
more effective, more organic and flexible, more likely to endure the
inevitable unexpected. Understanding the dynamic is the first step in
innovating in the practice of contract writing and re-engineer its scope
and power.
The starting point for the proposed approach is to take the contract
as just one of several dimensions of contractual relationships. Analyzing
the relational, economic, and legal dimension of the relationship as well
as both parties’ preferences helps to anticipate the dynamic and what
parties want to achieve. The contract can be designed accordingly and
become the platform that ties the elements of the various normative
frameworks together.
As discussed, these other normative frameworks may actually sup-
port parties’ motivation to cooperate, increase their positive perception
of the relationship with the other, reduce the likelihood of defection, and
strengthen the level of trust, leading to further cooperative behavior,
such as open communication (Ryall & Sampson 2003; Kamminga
2008). Adversely counterbalancing these factors, as contracts some-
times do, may result in distrust and get in the way of the kind of open
exchange of ideas and visions essential to cooperation and necessary
for achieving contractual goals (Macaulay 1963, Larson 1995; Dyer &
Singh 1998).
Moreover, integrating and accounting for the economic and rela-
tional norms often assure the flexibility needed to get projects done, a
flexibility that is missing in the contractual norms. The contractual frame-
work is, by nature, the most rigid dimension and potentially the most
adversarial of the three. Unlike the strictly legal approach, the relational
and economic frameworks introduce structures that allow for compro-
mise, which can supply to the cooperation and flexibility that contractual
endeavors often require to survive and succeed.
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Understanding this dynamic and knowing how to apply and inte-
grate it can help drafters design better contracts. To be able to identify
whether tensions between governance mechanisms exist and whether
they may become a cause of a breakdown of cooperation, one needs to
be able to understand the dynamic between the normative frameworks.
One can then assess the discrepancies between norm sets. Having a
better understanding of the relationship between these rule sets may lay
the groundwork for more integrative, self-sustaining contracts.
B. Understanding the dynamic between dimensions of
contractual relationships
Contract behavior literature provides a useful description of the
types of norms at play and which may conflict with each other. Three
dimensions can be distinguished: the business relationship dimension,
the economic deal dimension, and the contract dimension (Collins
1999). They each present a certain set of norms.
The business relationship entails the evolving relationship that is
built during and as a result of the series of transactions that necessitate
the contract. This relationship gets established during enquiries, discus-
sions of plans, and the deliberation of possible problems. It may be a new
relationship, but often, there will be already some existing or ongoing
relationship preceding parties’ decision to enter into a deal. Business
lunches and other informal interactions sustain it. The main criterion by
which to evaluate or assess the quality of the relationship is trust. This
relationship generates trust, which encourages parties to enter into
transactions in the first place (Gulati 1995; Macaulay 1963; Saxton
1997). It thrives on the establishment and preservation of trust. The nor-
mative framework that supports it includes customary standards of
trade, but it also includes the way of working that is unique to the parties’
current relationship and other factors established along the way. Actions
evaluated within the framework tend to be categorized as either demon-
strative of trustworthiness or the opposite (Collins, 1999). Contractual
behavior is evaluated by how the parties’ actions sustain or subvert the
bonds of trust (Ring & Van de Ven 1994; Gulati 1995).
The economic dimension is largely defined by the attractiveness of
the deal or agreement between the parties. Reciprocal obligations are
created, and the economic incentives and non-legal sanctions are estab-
lished. The main criterion here is economic rationality; actions are
assessed from the perspective of economic self-interest. Both short and
long term economic interests are considered in assessing contractual
behavior. The key measurements concern the price or costs of perfor-
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mance in relation to the value of the expected benefits. Contractual
performance is required only when the benefits exceed the costs of
default. From this perspective, incurring a penalty may be deemed ratio-
nal. It is important to note that acting in self-interest in the short-term is
unlikely to lead to cooperative conduct in the long run (Granovetter 1985;
Ring & Van de Ven 1992).
The third dimension is the contract itself. The formal agreement is
another frame of reference by which to judge whether the other party has
defaulted or cheated. The rules instituted by the contract are the main cri-
terion for making such assessments. The contract language describes
how the contract framework ‘thinks about’ (interprets) the relationship
between the parties. It emphasizes the autonomous, un-situated obliga-
tions constituted by the formal agreement. The way in which the contract
views disputes is a normative framework, which isolates the transaction
from its economic and social context. It treats the obligations undertaken
as absolute responsibilities, firm commitments, which cannot be revised
except through the process of revising the contract itself (Collins 1999).
Parties may decide to iron out the details of a potentially divisive issue in
a formal way for the purposes of clarifying the problem and determining
the allocation of risks and liabilities in advance. This may even be done
using terms that might not be enforceable in a court of law.
Taken together, these three dimensions, derived from these nor-
mative frameworks, provide guidelines that parties use to select and
manage their own behavior. These same rules also determine the way in
which one party will judge the behavior of the other party. These dimen-
sions and the normative frameworks that come with them are applied
within the context of a particular contractual relationship and within the
context of the history of the parties’ prior relationship. They are grounded
in law and personal relationships, and they are important in the construc-
tion of market relations. The parties can think and converse about their
relationship in different ways. The manner in which they proceed will
depend on which normative framework is providing the dominant points
of reference.
Tensions can arise when the norms that result from the relational
and economic dimensions invoke obligations that go contrary to the
norms laid down in the contract. When contractual thinking intersects
with relational and economic norms, each normative structure may pro-
vide opposing valuations of conduct, and as a result, conflict and
competition arise. The non-contractual dimensions may exclude con-
tractual thinking and treat it as dysfunctional, as lacking the appropriate
understanding of events and relations (Collins 1999).
TENSIONS BETWEEN CONTRACTUAL AND NON-CONTRACTUAL NORMS 33
These tensions also lead to dilemmas for the managers involved in
choosing which rules take priority. They struggle with the choices sup-
posed of blindly following the contract, looking for opportunities to be
creative within the terms of the contract, doing what is in the best interest
of the company, or adhering to their own set of rules in day-to-day opera-
tions? The type of rule set that will be chosen depends on the mandates
given to agents, as well as those agents’ personal philosophies regard-
ing norms that ought to apply in contractual relationships.3
This variety of applicable rules can lead to complications at the
organizational level. One can imagine different norm sets being selected
and applied, depending on the nature of the prevailing circumstances.
Almost inevitably, competing normative frameworks will be applied by
different departments within the same organization. Discussions could,
for example, arise between the legal department that drafted a contract
applying a strictly contractual framework and the department involved in
contract management, for whom the relationship may be at least as
important as the contract document.
Furthermore, parties may choose different, dominant norm sets
and still tensions over the weight of individual elements of understanding
may arise. Such a scenario could arise if both parties rely on the contract
as the dominant normative structure. That, of course, is the ideal situa-
tion from a lawyer’s perspective. In a second potential scenario, they
both use one of the non-legal frameworks as the dominant normative
structure – the norms deriving from the business relation or economics
of the deal dimension. This second scenario creates an unstable situa-
tion where parties may be forced to revert to the contract to resolve
differences, requiring a third party’s involvement. In a third potential
scenario, the purchasing party may use the contract for guidance, while
the supplier applies the norms inherent in the relation or economic deal
dimension.
In any of these potential situations, problems appear when dis-
agreement arises, since each party is judging the other’s behavior based
on different points of reference. For example, the purchaser may find that
the supplier is not following the procedures as laid out in the contract. The
supplier justifies this change relative to the contract by referring to a
give-and-take mechanism that the parties developed over time. Such a
mechanism allows for more flexibility in dealing with minor schedule
changes, as both parties may need to ask for changes at different points
in time. By evaluating parties’ contractual behavior using an assessment
tool, such discrepancies may be identified – ideally ahead of contract
design. By taking the time to conduct an analysis of contractual drivers
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and parties’ preferences, parties can anticipate potential problems and
agree on a mechanism to address them.
C. A framework for contract design – assessing tensions and
drafting contracts
Theory that examines the different dimensions of contractual
behavior and empirics about contract success could be of use to design-
ers. It would be beneficial to get a good grasp of the different contractual
dimensions, which then enables drafters to attempt to align these dimen-
sions. With this foundation, applying a variety of norms for the purpose of
evaluating the same issue would not represent a source of tensions
between parties or in their own organizations. Instead, if well aligned and
well thought through, these norms may reinforce each other.
In the next two parts, I propose a two-step diagnose-and-design
approach. It may be used for detecting tensions between norms upfront
and addressing them. In the following section, I discuss the idea of diag-
nosing whether contractual relations are exposed to actual or potential
derailment of the cooperation process and what to pay particular atten-
tion to. Following from the discussion of assessment or diagnosis, I
propose some guidelines for integrating the collected information about
the identified tensions into designing the contractual environment for
long-term business relations.
1. Assessing potential tensions between formal and informal
structures
A feasible method for analyzing the influencers of contractual
behavior would need to focus on the following five elements: (1) identify-
ing the different norm sets at play; (2) determining whether parties are in
agreement about the applicable norm set and about the actual norms
they set forth; (3) identifying whether tensions between these sets may
arise, and, if so, the nature of the tensions; (4) identifying the dominant
norm set at different points in time; and (5) determining if disruptive shifts
between norm sets are to be expected.
Step one entails identifying the norms that parties are likely to
apply. The dimensions of the contractual relationship as described ear-
lier in some detail are the relationship dimension, the deal dimension,
and the contract dimension. Each dimension has its own standard
norms. These norms may differ and result in different perceptions on
what the relationship is all about. For instance, from a contract perspec-
TENSIONS BETWEEN CONTRACTUAL AND NON-CONTRACTUAL NORMS 35
tive the relationship between the contract parties is mostly a set of rights
both parties have and duties they owe each other. From a relationship
dimension perspective it is all about how the relationship most optimally
functions based on the norms that represent acceptable behavior in the
specific sector and the routines parties develop amongst each other.
That determines what is acceptable, expected and ‘fair’. Someone look-
ing at the economic dimension of a relationship will perceive the benefits
parties could derive from the particular project parties embark upon and
the costs thereof as main drivers of ones actions. Similarly, the normative
perspective one takes determines whether the contract partners’ behav-
ior will be evaluated as positive or negative, and knowing what norm set
takes priority may help predict the others behavior. After all, the choice of
norm set also determines the parties’ own decision-making, and the
measures that will be used to take actions. What course of action saves
the most costs? What reaps the most benefit? Or what is the best for the
relationship in the long run?
The second step in assessing tensions is to explore whether par-
ties are in agreement about the most important norms and the exact
meaning of the agreed upon norms. It is necessary to determine if parties
agree on the applicable normative framework and the norms it sets forth,
and which norm should get priority in a certain situation in case they do
not align.
The third step in the assessment is determining whether tensions
between the normative structures exist, and if so, the nature of those ten-
sions. Having multiple standards function in parallel means that the
norms they set forth may collide and compete with each other. Certain
behavior can, for instance, be in accordance with one set of norms (e.g.
the contract) and interfere with another (e.g. the economically most ben-
eficial course of action).
The fourth step is to identify the dominant normative framework that
the parties are likely to apply at different points in their relationship – do
contractual norms go above other norms, or is the relationship consid-
ered most important? All dimensions may be relevant, but one
framework will often dominate at certain times. What are parties’ prefer-
ences in this regard? The influence of the relationship norms in
contractual relationships can at some point turn out to be stronger than
the contract norms. This is evidenced by the presence of contractual
behavior that is not justifiable by the contract – a purchaser may decide
not to enforce his rights with regard to a planned delivery or a missed
milestone but allow the supplier some flexibility to deliver shortly
thereafter.
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The fifth and final step in the assessment is determining whether
there are disruptive shifts from one dominant norm set to the other occur-
ring or expected. Sudden shifts in dominant normative orientation can,
for instance, arise during a dispute. These shifts may go in different
directions. For instance, a shift from the relationship as the dominant
framework to a pure contractual approach may result in a move towards
a more rigid negotiation approach, and away from a more flexible man-
ner of dealing with changing circumstances. On the other hand, when
trust levels are high between parties, the shift may go the other way –
from a strictly contractual approach towards a more relational approach.
The shifts that occur away from the relationship dimension are
obviously more problematic from a cooperation perspective. They may,
for instance, happen when the contractual parties experience financial
strain. For instance, in our example of the construction project, one
can imagine that a relational approach to a more contractual or legal
approach often occurs when losses are experienced on the side of con-
tractors, when costs turn out much higher than anticipated, or when the
contract was won at a price that results in thin or even non-existent
margins. In addition, changes in preferences may lead to shifts. The
contracting officer of the purchaser responsible for administering and
oversight of the project may get worried about missing deadlines and
request a stricter application of the contract. A strict interpretation and
narrow reading of the contract’s scope can lead to penalties. Shifts may
also occur when compromise seems not to work anymore, and a strict
contractual interpretation appears to be the only option.
Adverse circumstances or the anticipation of unwanted outcomes
may drive both parties away from a more cooperative and flexible
approach towards a more rigid, contract driven stance. Particularly, the
shift from a relational to an economic or a contractual framework can fos-
ter an adversarial atmosphere. Such a shift in the frame of reference
easily hardens the relationship and leads to distrust, which may deterio-
rate cooperation even further (Macaulay 1963; Dyer & Singh 1998).
Understanding these dynamics helps understand how contractual rela-
tionships evolve and anticipate the hurdles along the way, the first step in
trying to capture them in contracts, working with them instead of against
them.
2. Integrating the dimensions in contract design
Collecting information about the variety of applicable norms, the
likely dynamic, and the parties’ preferences is analogous to having all
pieces of the puzzle. The next step, then, is trying to assemble the puzzle
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– merging the norms to better manage the cooperation process. Design
principles may be formulated to guide that process.
Parties, by now, should have realized that there are multiple norm
sets driving contractual behavior. The occurrence of this variety also
requires accepting that parties may shift between these rule sets at
times throughout the lifetime of the contractual relationship. An approach
that accounts for this tendency to shift may keep parties out of the
«trenches», keep them from retreating to legal positions. This approach
to contract design ideally facilitates that process and enables parties to
maintain or loop back to cooperative behavior more easily.
Once sufficient insight is obtained regarding potential tensions
between norms sets, the actual contract design effort becomes focused
on integrating the dimensions, along with their norms, in a constructive
and coherent contractual structure. The objective to embrace the differ-
ent dimensions of contractual behavior, taking into account the parties
preferences with regard to the norm sets, and providing for smooth tran-
sitions from one normative framework to another. Its application requires
a practicable strategy for integrating the different norm sets.
Integrating norms may help in dealing with the instability of sepa-
rate norm structures. By simply anticipating the application of the
different norms, one can foresee where they may compete and antici-
pate when shifts in the dominant dimension may occur. Integrating
various dimensions into the contract may help overcome the drawbacks
of the individual dimensions, while also allowing for the oversight and
legal enforcement of obligations. Balancing these elements in practice
may require enforcing certain aspects and diminishing those others that
tend to undermine cooperation between parties.
The first step in integrating the norm sets is to choose a dimension
or platform. Of the three, the contract seems the most plausible and
stable platform, the most malleable and controllable basis. It possesses
all the advantages inherent in a contract, and it serves the functions of
information carrier, risk allocator. If need be, it is legally enforceable, and
contract law allows parties broad freedom to agree on both content and
process. In supplementing these core legal features of the contract, one
can import other norms into it.
Parties may initially want to focus on filling in the essentials of the
contract. These essentials consist of the parts that define and address
the basic substance of the project – the specifications, the conditions, the
scope of project, and the timeframe for the deliverables. The establish-
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ment of these elements provides a structure into which the normative
structures can then be integrated.
The next step could consist of defining the rules governing the par-
ties’ interactions. Apart from documenting the contract essentials, a
contract can empower parties to create their own distinct understanding
of the rules that should govern their relationship. A contract can contain
detailed specifications of the normative standards that should apply to
the various aspects of the relationship. There is room to adjust to what
both parties like best and prefer to establish as the rules governing their
relationship. These elements of contracts concern aspects that influence
cooperation – the interaction and coordination between parties – and
represent points where ideas derived from the other frameworks can be
integrated. Parties may use aspects from the various norm sets to deter-
mine how they will proceed in their coordination of efforts. They can
brainstorm or otherwise determine where relational principles and norms
are leading, on which items the economic norms are likely to be the most
useful as guiding principles, and with regard to information exchange
about risks and anticipated changes, what norms they agree on. The
parties can also devise rewards for speedy project delivery, decide
which incentives best meet the contractors and agencies interests, and
agree on workable processes to deal with change orders rapidly and at a
low cost.
The next step would be choosing the best practices that best sup-
port a cooperative relationship. Experiences with cooperative principles
and studies, for instance, can provide a good sense of the most common
human tendencies and traits with regard to information exchange, the
most acceptable social norms and most common triggers of economic
behavior with regard to penalties and responses to unexpected events.
The selection may be based on these insights on the drivers of
cooperation.
The next step should be to incorporate the rules governing the con-
tractual relationship into the contract. Regular contract evaluation allows
parties to refine, adapt, and incorporate the aspects of the three nor-
mative frameworks that both parties further agree on to guide their
relationship.
These proposed steps to identifying potential tensions and
attempting to integrate informal governance structures in the overall con-
tract design comprise only one example of how lawyers may claim a
more constructive role in helping contract parties actually achieve their
goals without the intrusion of unresolvable conflict.
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IV. IMPLEMENTING NEW CONTRACTING STRATEGIES
IN A CHANGING LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
Another challenge in the implementation of this cooperative
approach in legal practice is getting lawyers to actually design these
types of contracts. This final section discusses the obstacles faced when
attempting to integrate this approach into contracting. A return to the diffi-
culties of contract innovation and options to possibly overcome them are
discussed below.
A. Why lawyers would embrace designing contracts that
support cooperation
The foregoing may convince those lawyers who strongly believe a
contract serves to plan the relationship, but will other lawyers that see the
role of contracts more limited also be sufficiently enticed to embrace the
role of incubating cooperation? Clearly, there are barriers to implemen-
tation similar to those that slow down innovation, but I believe some
counterarguments can be presented that may encourage lawyers to
embrace such a role after all.
It is a fact of life that in many countries lawyers are the dominant
force when it comes to contract design, and it’s also the case that they
tend to be hesitant when it comes to innovation.11 Law, after all derives
much of its structure and force from longstanding traditions; slow change
or no change may equal stability. It comes as no surprise that obstacles
to contract innovation present themselves in lawyers’ views of their prior-
ities and roles, in the risks associated with changes in contracting
strategy, and in the problem of so-called ‘stickiness’ of contracts (Pres-
ton & McCann 2012). Some have also pointed out the absence of an
ability to benefit from contract innovation through securing intellectual
property rights dis-incentivizes the very impetus to innovate. Again, oth-
ers have argued law firm dynamics get in the way (Gulati & Scott 2011;
Triantis 2013). Multiple factors are slowing down innovation in contract
design. The lack of incentive to innovate only partly explains why lawyers
do not draft more cooperative contracts. Having lawyers involved is of
course not all bad. A benefit is that clients get the careful review of con-
tracts and risk management that only lawyers can provide. A downside is
that innovation in contracting easily gets drowned out by lawyers that see
contract innovation as too much of a risk.
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11. Depending on the country and the experience of purchasers these roles may vary. But
oftentimes approval of these terms will lie with an external lawyer.
Lawyers are trained to design certain types of contracts and inno-
vation is associated with legal risk. In these circumstances, contracts are
mostly drafted with a focus on their role of underpinning the parties’ com-
mitment to their obligations. This function remains critically important
since the complexity of large-scale projects can provide many opportu-
nities and temptations for opportunistic behavior (Williamson 2002).
Lawyers are incentivized to focus attention on defining the objective
(effort or task at hand, quality of the goods or service), the payment
arrangements, and the parties’ legal rights and duties related to risk dis-
tribution, responsibilities, and applicable law. Lawyers try to make sure
their clients get what they want by negotiating a legally enforceable, valid
agreement that states the duties and rights of both parties and allocates
risks optimally. This approach may lead to a shift of risk to the other side,
but it does not foster cooperative contracting.
Second, lawyers by nature tend to be traditionalists – risk averse
and not likely inclined to try out new types of contracts. The reasons
include professional liability and uncertainty with respect to how courts
may deal with new kinds of contract clauses.
Third, results of recent studies indicate that contracts are “sticky”
(Gulati & Scott 2012), particularly standard term contracts. A standard
contract can, once made, stay unchanged for generations. This is a
common, important dynamic that can hold back innovation. It also under-
mines the quality and effectiveness of contracts.
The empirical literature on drafting habits also points out that law-
yers, in their role as contract engineers, rarely make contracts from
scratch, but rather adapt and assemble standard contracts either devel-
oped by their law firm, or based on trade standards designed by
associations.12 In fact, findings suggest that very little time seems to go
into the drafting of these contracts (three and a half minutes according to
Gulati & Scott) even when it comes to high stake business contracts
(Gulati & Scott 2012). What may be suggested by these findings is that
some of the reluctance to draft innovatively in response to shifting client
needs may be rooted in the fact that many lawyers actually perform very
little drafting.
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12. Gulati and Scott refer to the notion of contract routines, lawyers are working with a
complex set of contractual structures and no one may completely understand the
relationship between certain provisions and the larger contractual structure. Out of a
fear of upsetting other contractual provisions unwittingly they tend to refrain from mak-
ing any alternations, Gulati & Scott 2012 at pp. 38, 39.
In practice, the rational motivations and objectives are often not
translated in improved contract design (Gulati & Scott 2012; Ben-Shahar
& Pottow 2006; Choi & Gulati 2006). As a result, imprecise contract lan-
guage remains present in contracts because changing it brings along the
risk that a court might adopt a different and destabilizing interpretation of
the term. This lack of motivation to change may also apply to tensions
between formal contracts and informal governance mechanisms. Empir-
ical studies also identify a general trend of reluctance to change
contracts, rooted partially in agency problems (Korobkin 1998). So, law-
yers may tend to refrain from optimizing standard form contracts even
when that would benefit parties. This literature suggest that the amount
of care put into the actual drafting of contracts is not optimal – let alone
new contract optimizations being added – and that tensions may not be
discovered for a long time.
Compounding these challenges, contract negotiators tend to
spend most time negotiating over terms that address consequences of
claims, and do not give much attention to terms that business managers
find important – the terms dealing with the management of the relation-
ship and changes which may prevent claims (IACCM 2011).13 In other
words, tensions may lie dormant for years in contracts, and terms
addressing coordination issues can get less attention than the typical
legal terms.
So how can we trigger change? Significant chances and innovation
in contract design do happen, but they often appear to be the result of
external forces. This implies that exogenous factors may trigger change,
rather than internal ‘best-term-survives’ dynamics (Gulati & Scott 2012).
Innovation literature suggests that so-called ‘shocks to the system’ lead
to evaluation. Examples in the area of contracting are court decisions on
the judicial interpretation of a contract term as we saw above, but change
may also result from shifts in markets and the need to respond to new
knowledge.14
The question arises whether such shocks to the system are cur-
rently happening and whether they are strong enough to overcome the
obstacles that stand in the way of innovation. Some developments may
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13. The International Association for Contract and Commercial Management collects
information among contract negotiators from various industries about the most nego-
tiated terms. At the top of the list: limitation of liability, indemnification, price related
terms, scope and goals, liquidated damages, and payment clauses (IIACCM 2013).
14. A more sudden shift in contracts may be the response to a shock causing changes in
the legal landscape. It triggers or may force firms to innovate and respond to those
changes, however, often this response is not instantaneous, Gulati & Scott (2012).
qualify. First, the changing demands of a lawyers’ client may potentially
push for more integrated contract design. Developments such as
increasingly demanding and critical clients and other changes in the
legal profession may require lawyers to come up with innovative con-
tracts. This includes contracts that better foster cooperation and reduce
the chance of conflicts and allow clients to really voice their preferences
and concerns. If reward mechanisms for lawyers could be more
results-based and based on the amount of disputes or uncertainty result-
ing from contracts as a factor taken into account, this may also lead to
changes in contract design. Shifting from a document good enough to
stand up in court to a document that tries to make collaboration go as
smoothly as possible and without any disruption.
Second, what can further help make the difference are empowered
clients who start to change what they ask from lawyers and become very
specific about it – clients who question the assumption that a contract is a
necessary evil and instead consider it as an opportunity to build in certain
cooperative behavior. These clients will ask for a different type of con-
tract, not the usual safety net or protection against the other side, not a
mechanism for allocating blame or facilitating clean-up after relationship
failure. These traditional tasks of the contract, all of which anticipate the
non-achievement of parties’ goals, can be managed and avoided by
making cooperation attractive. The contract as a threat composed
of legal repercussions does not necessarily present an incentive to coop-
erate.
What also will be important is an increased awareness among cli-
ents that failure to use contracts to facilitate cooperation is a missed
opportunity in the long run. It means that users will need to be creative in
finding opportunities to cooperate and find solutions to coordination
problems that do not involve the contract. As soon as using the contract
seems to serve the interests of a party better, or if it is too complex to
manage, the contract is back on the table and provides little guidance
apart from a mediation clause or a procedure for dealing with changes.
As an encouraging sign, some sectors may be spearheading
change, as they are more inclined to asking for innovation and require it
more than others. Early adapters can often be found in industries that are
innovative and used to operating in uncertain environments. These
areas include as R&D collaboration in the pharmaceutical industry,
various strategic alliances, and projects in the construction sector
(Kamminga 2008; Furlotti & Grandori 2010; Gilson et al. 2010). In these
industries, parties are aware of the need to adapt to changing circum-
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stances and are constantly reminded of the complex interdependence,
technical resources, innovation, and expense required to develop new
products.
CONCLUSION
In the previous sections, the central claim has been that, despite
obvious problems with contracts as cooperation mechanisms, there has
been little contract innovation focused on making contract better in that
respect. Innovation still receives little attention in contract design.
Lawyers, as the primary drafters of contracts, can change this fact,
but they must have sufficient incentive to do so. Lawyers may not be
prone to change in the absence of outside triggers. It appears that a fun-
damentally wrong assumption is still underlying most contract design
efforts; namely, that contracts are governance mechanisms, which, if
adequately and forcefully designed, will prevail and drown out other
dynamics and drivers of contractual behavior such as social norms, eco-
nomic incentives and self-interest, and trust dynamics. As a result
contracts are of little help in establishing the type of cooperation manage-
ment researchers have found essential in complex contractual relations.
This articles advocates for a contracting approach that integrates
these non-contractual drivers into contract design. Adapting an interdis-
ciplinary contracting approach to contracting may be a way forward
for lawyers who want to support their clients’ achievement of the type
of cooperation that empiricists have found essential for achieving con-
tractual goals. In situations where parties cannot rely on a smoothly
functioning legal environment, contracts may be of particular help by
including or aligning with other governance structures.
Lawyers who step outside of the comfort zone of traditional con-
tracts may start to provide their clients with both a stable contractual
environment and a framework with which to integrate and align the reality
of business endeavors. Lawyers who explore and address both aspects
become lawyers who provide better value-for-money to their clients,
avoid disputes more effectively, and contribute to necessary legal
innovation.
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